areas of policy that developed rapidly in response to the new conditions of peace, increased US economic power, the development of national security ideas and the commitment to 
questioned the idea that Bevin was operating on the basis of a strategic plan, they accepted the established view that he was committed without reservation to a close Anglo-American cooperative relationship. Indeed, it was suggested that Bevin 'loved the United States.' 10 Geoffrey Warner described the development under Bevin of an 'obsequious dependence on the United States.' 11 Revisionism failed to dent the orthodoxy on Bevin, though Bevin's limitations with regard to the Palestine issue, his attachment to the idea of development of the empire and his failure to follow through on the issue of the leadership of Western Europe have qualified the uncritical, indeed hagiographic, image. With consensus between traditionalists and revisionists on Bevin's views of the United States, aspects of his aims in dealing with the US have remained under-analysed, amongst them the question of whether his foreign policy was actually based on a fundamentally different picture of the US to that of his left-wing critics.
Thus, when Wayne Knight argued that Bevin and the FO were clearly committed to the Anglo-American alliance, and to projecting the image of Britain as America's 'sure friend,' the implication is that Bevin's views on the US were some way from those of the left. Any reservations he may have had regarding the predatory nature of American capitalism were subordinated to the policy of expressing positive opinions of, and gratitude towards the US. 12 A point that a number of historians have made is that Bevin did not write his views down extensively. He kept no diary and was not a great letter-writer. If Peter Weiler is correct that officials in the FO were 'ghost-writers' of papers sent out under his name, then there are even fewer genuine unmediated examples of Bevin's thought while Foreign Secretary. 13 Of course, it was usual practice for Foreign Secretaries' telegrams, Cabinet papers and memoranda to be drafted by others. For those trying to identify Bevin's personal views independent of those of his officials, this poses a problem. It makes it difficult to challenge the idea advanced by revisionists that Bevin adopted the views of the FO. 14 Moreover, Cabinet and Defence Committee records are not verbatim minutes, but summaries of discussion and conclusions, and in view of the principle of cabinet collective responsibility are designed to elide over differences of opinion. They are thus a flawed source of Bevin's views. In a similar vein, his meetings with foreign diplomats were based on FO briefingsthough careful deconstruction can sometimes identify Bevin's particular and unique tropes and themes. However, it is striking how little direct quotation of the man himself there is in accounts of Bevin as Foreign Secretary, as opposed to telegrams and papers put forward in his name, but the product of the combined efforts of the Bevin and his drafting officials.
Views are frequently ascribed to him from more or less indirect records, or from inference.
However, Bevin's personal views can be teased out from the record. Evidence of Bevin himself writing on key issues unmediated is particularly worthy of attention. When this is done for the key period of 1947, when Bevin in the established picture is seen as beginning to enact his plan of forging a close Anglo-American alliance, it becomes clear that his view of the United States and its policy to Britain was far from uncritical. Indeed, his advocacy of public expressions of gratitude and solidarity towards the US was increasingly qualified by a festering resentment -even as he defended the US against his own critics on the left -of what he saw as self-centred and ungenerous US policies.
'An ungenerous attitude'
Alan Bullock wrote that while Bevin was keen for the US to take a greater share of responsibility for the security of Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, he understood better than many of his colleagues and party members the difficulties that the Americans found in adjusting to this more active and interventionist peacetime world role. Bullock sees Bevin as determined to be patient and not to force the pace. 15 Attlee replied to Inverchapel himself, and also forwarded the letter to his Foreign Secretary. 28 Bevin was moved to send a six page letter, written from the heart. He was at that time awaiting indications of whether the new US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, would be an improvement on his predecessor. Initial impressions of Marshall in the early stages of the Moscow meeting were not very favourable. 29 The letter was written just five days after Truman made the statement to Congress that quickly became labelled the Truman Doctrine, and which hindsight has seen as a turning point in US attitudes towards intervention overseas. 30 However, although he was aware of the speech, he does not mention it nor give any hint that he sensed a change in US policy doctrines, which rather undermines the argument advanced first by Francis Williams in 1952 that Bevin had deliberately timed the announcement of withdrawal of British aid to Greece in order to engender a response by
Truman along these very lines. 31 Instead, he launched a sharp critique of United States attitudes to Britain.
Bevin acknowledged the 'Crossman venture', as he called it, had had an effect on American attitudes, though he had done his best to minimise it, with some success, in discussions with Byrnes and Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg. However, Bevin felt the problem went deeper than that. There were some matters the US government needed to remember. He had put these to Byrnes and he would try to impress them on Marshall when he got the opportunity to talk quietly to him. Bevin then put the blame for Britain's post-war difficulties squarely on the Americans, and specifically on the 'sudden snapping of Lease-Lend.' He said that at the time the loan was being negotiated he had impressed on Will Clayton, under-secretary of state with responsibility for economic affairs, that if the Americans took the action they proposed and did not give Britain time to stabilise itself, especially in food, then they would create a situation where they would have to step in and take over Britain's responsibilities themselves. He had suggested to them that that was actually what they were after, but they denied it. Bevin said that he had then pointed out:
(and this has a great bearing on their future attitude towards us) that if they treated us in the narrow conception then revealed we could not in the immediate future carry the load we had been in the habit of bearing.
Bevin then cited the example of British support for Greece, and claimed that the British had met American wishes in that country, but had received no financial support, even though Bevin was 'constantly emphasising that we were getting to the end of our tether.'
Bevin felt that US officials tended just to gloss over these matters. In a similar vein, Bevin turned to the issue of the former Italian colony of Cyrenaica, which Bevin at one time had ambitions to make into a British strategic holding. He blamed the failure to gain a good settlement of this issue squarely on the Americans. This, he said, meant the British missed a potential budget saving of £50 million a year. Bevin's broad point was clear: far from seeing Britain's economic problems as a sign of their lack of willpower or creeping socialism the Americans should recognise the impact of their own policies -and therefore see Britain in a different light. 32 The accuracy of Bevin's recollections of the recent past is less important here than the fact that this was his perception. The issue clearly rankled deeply. In the letter, Bevin went on to discuss domestic attitudes to the United States, in a manner which showed that he shared many of the views that had motivated the Crossmanite critique. These were the views, he was careful to say, of many of his great friends in the Labour Party who were by no means fellow-travellers (so they were not just motivated by an unthinking pro-Sovietism that meant their views should be dismissed). These people, Bevin said, with the implication that he fully understood this element of the views of his critics and even sympathised with it, were influenced in their view of Anglo-American relations because they felt that the United States administration 'has given us a pretty raw deal.' Sometimes, when focusing on Bevin the statesman, and basing analysis on FO records, historians can fail to factor into the equation his cultural background and the firm set of attitudes and perceptions that he carried with him from his working class and trade union background into government and diplomacy. Yet they were a by no means negligible part of Bevin's world view.
Focusing on the issue of food imports, Bevin reported, with evident sympathy, a growing feeling in England in the constituencies that our people are being kept on rations and going through difficult times as a result of what is sometimes regarded as an ungenerous attitude when it gets to business and not talk.
He gave a homely example, that of his own charwoman, who had requested that she could start work an hour earlier, at 6 a.m., in order to be able to join the food queue at 10 a.m. so she would be able to feed her family. Department, where departmental prejudice meant a failure 'to understand the actual position and so in their actions to make contributions to a better understanding and good relations.'
He asked Inverchapel to mention these matters 'when you are talking in your own way', and ended typically bullishly, 'I am not yielding to any pressure, if I may say so from anybody.
But whatever happens we are going to get through. The United States Chiefs of Staff and others need be under no delusion about that.' 33 Bevin does not seem to have repeated these views in so many words to Marshall while they were in Moscow. 34 Bevin had been unwell at the start of the conference, but his health improved and he became immersed in other problems. By the end of the long and fruitless conference, he and his officials had formed an improved view of Marshall's capabilities -though when Bevin reported privately to Attlee, and warned that the 'two big boys' were increasingly lining up against each other, he did not entirely excuse the Americans of responsibility for this state of affairs.
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This letter is particularly interesting in the light of the Cabinet discussions that had taken place in London before Bevin had left for Moscow on the subject of British aid to Greece and Turkey. Byrnes had given rather vague assurances that the US would assist with the burden of helping the anti-communist activities of the Turkish and Greek governments.
This was a burden that the Cabinet saw to be increasingly beyond Britain's means.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton was pressing for complete withdrawal, but the Cabinet had decided to find out how much of the burden the US would be prepared to bear. It has been suggested that Bevin made sure this was couched in such a way to force the Americans to make a quick decision, by holding out the spectre of immediate British withdrawal. Robert Frazier has raised doubts that the British were quite so machiavellian in their strategy: this letter does show that Bevin for one was in a mood to take whatever opportunity offered to bring the Americans to 'take up their responsibilities' -but he does not seem to have seen the Truman Doctrine, which some claim the British demarche to the Americans deliberately provoked, as showing that they were doing this. 36 However, it does
give some substance to the idea, for it shows Bevin strongly concerned that the Americans pick up the burden that the British, in his view, had been carrying for far too long. On the other hand, his main emphasis was certainly not that the US should replace Britain, but that it should moderate its financial and economic policies to enable Britain to continue to maintain their shared interests. It was a broader American attitude, rather than just the matter of the Eastern Mediterranean, about which Bevin was so exercised.
The Americans come through -after a fashion
In the following months, the US government gave signs that it was moving to a new attitude regarding economic assistance for Europe, which culminated in Marshall's speech at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, in which he said that the US would provide support if the Europeans devised a viable multi-national plan for recovery. Bevin acted with vigour to seize the opportunity and co-ordinate a European response -though not quite so fast as some claim. 37 However, it remained the case that the British felt that their own economic situation was not being treated sympathetically, or with realisation of the consequences of the conditions the Americans had insisted upon for the post-war loan. 38 The Americans made clear that they would not help individual European countries, or give aid 'piecemeal,' and also said that this included Britain, which was not to be treated as a special case. 39 The Krock's words, 'deadlinitis': that is, that they tended to leave it to the last possible moment to announce major policy shifts, which always amounted to retreats. The implication was that they were using this tactic to force the Americans to take over their responsibilities by hustling them into making quick decisions in a contrived atmosphere of crisis. Bevin said that he resented the suggestion that Britain used 'shock tactics' with the Americans. The question of withdrawal of troops from Greece was discussed, he said, a year ago. The problem was, he thought,' that until we take definite action, the State Department does not take us seriously'. Bevin went on to argue that the deadlines were imposed by the dollar, and had been advanced earlier than expected because Truman had lifted controls on the dollar, leading to a 40 percent reduction in its value. This went against pledges made when the loan was negotiated and seriously reduced the actual value of the loan and therefore the time it lasted. The British need for interim aid to keep it going between the imminent exhaustion of the loan and the implementation of Marshall Aid had become acute. 44 Bevin added that Britain had been in Greece for three years, when it had originally intended only to be there a few months. Warming to his criticism, he added, …when we went in there, we received no support from the U.S. and certainly no kind words from them. We were tilted at and pulled to pieces in the U.S. on all sides.
The rant continued. The note of his views concluded on a typical note:
As regards resistance to Communism, the Secretary of State feels that no one -and certainly no U. S. statesmanhas shown as firm and as consistent resistance to Communism as he has himself. 46 In the end, the letter was not sent. Inverchapel was in England, and Bevin was persuaded by his officials that the ambassador could convey his views to Balfour in person. 47 In the months that followed, the embassy continued to report such views as characteristic of American opinion. In September, Bevin made an off-the-cuff suggestion that again revealed his inner sense of impatience with American policy. He proposed that a release of gold from Fort Knox would at one stroke address the financial crisis. American opinion did not take kindly to this remark. In November the head of the British Information Service in Washington, Bill Edwards, again launched a stinging attack on 'deadlinitis'. The embassy staff were in fact caught between a rock and a hard place. 48 They had been encouraged by the FO in the belief that their prime task was the positive projection of Britain. To do this, they had identified certain key themes that would play well with American officials, Congressmen, journalists and public opinion. They would emphasise continually that Labour reforms had left 80 percent of the British economy in private hands, that the Crossmanite rebels were unrepresentative, that the British empire was reforming in a progressive direction, and most importantly that Britain was a strong-willed and reliable partner in the conflict with Soviet-backed communism. 49 This projection strategy was complicated by the main outcome desired in Whitehall during 1947, which was American financial help. Emphasising the strength of Bevin and Attlee's anti-communism helped, but the embassy accurately perceived American (especially congressional) misgivings about giving aid to Britain. Americans did not like to feel they were sponsoring state socialism, but more important than that -and this was harder to combat -was the distaste at helping out a lame duck. Comments like Bevin's Fort Knox proposal only served to reinforce the idea that
Britain expected a handout. 50 It was believed to be vital to demonstrate that Britain was a going concern, working flat out to solve its own problems, and determined to do so. But at the same time Americans needed to be impressed with Britain's urgent need for help. It was a fine line to walk.
Bevin's personal tendency was to emphasise that Britain's problems derived from past American actions. This was not seen in the embassy or the FO to be a very fruitful line of argument to pursue. But the embassy's failure to place the blame on the US brought down
Bevinian complaints that they were not being robust enough in answering American criticisms. It was the embassy's job to report American attitudes -but when they did so,
Bevin reacted as if to report them was to endorse them. To a degree, there was some truth in this, in particular with regard to the issue of 'deadlinitis', a characterisation of British policy with which the embassy clearly agreed. Bevin's reaction was to see the embassy as having 'gone native' and would no tolerate that. Bevin's style inclined towards the crudely direct:
while he usually kept this in check when working with the FO, whose approach tended more to the suave, this instance is one example, fired by his frustration with the Americans, when he let his feelings show.
These expressions of Bevin's viewpoint produced a concrete result later in the year in things worked in Washington. Thus, at this point, as on the occasions earlier in the year noted in this paper, at heart his attitude was that the Americans needed to be shown in stark fashion that Britain was not responsible for its economic and financial plight, the Americans were. He was frustrated when he felt that this message was not being put across in the clear and unequivocal manner that he himself had expressed it. He plainly did not see that when he had tried to do so, as in his ill-conceived suggestion about the Fort Knox gold, it had had quite the opposite effect to the one intended.
As it turned out, Inverchapel, Sir Oliver Franks, who was heading a mission from the Committee on European Economic Cooperation, and the others actually in Washington were proved correct. Working at a pace determined by the political situation, Congress, called into special session by Truman, did start to address the problem in a helpful manner. However, Bevin remained dissatisfied with the messenger, and, concurring with the view of officials that the embassy was out of touch with the situation in Britain, he decided that Inverchapel should be replaced. Ironically, Bevin's choice of successor was Franks, who had shared the embassy's belief that Whitehall was panicking. 54 Once again, however, Bevin had acted on the idea that American views were unreasonable and that robust rebuttal was the way to change them. This extended to the contentious issue of his attitude to the concept of a Third Force.
Conclusion
Bevin strongly asserted Britain's status as a Great Power. 56 It has been shown that while .
Attlee and Bevin's conception of the Third Force stressed its anti-totalitarian aspect stronger than did that of the left, making the US a closer partner for it than the USSR could be, they continued through 1947 to cherish ideas that Britain's power-base could be based on the 'middle of the planet' independent of both the US and the USSR. 
